By Dr. Luis Eduardo Cortés Riera
UCLA-UPEL-IPB-Buría Foundation
Carora–Barquisimeto, Venezuela, July 2007
Introduction
Various situations and experiences throughout my long career as a history teacher and researcher—as well as my reading of classic authors from across the historiographical tradition—have inspired these reflections. Under this insidious title, I hope to motivate young scholars of this still-nascent social science to clarify certain concepts and categories, to pose new problems, and to discard old and misleading ideas that, despite their fallacies, have significantly influenced historical thinking from Herodotus and Polybius to Edward Gibbon and Leopold von Ranke, ideas which have reached us with unexpected strength and authority.
The term “sin” that I use here is borrowed from the eminent French historian Lucien Febvre, a member of the Collège de France, who called anachronism the gravest and most unforgivable of sins. Since my undergraduate days (1972–1976) at the now bicentennial University of the Andes and its School of History, I had taken note of this sin—the first and most damaging one a historian can commit. However, that school’s focus lay elsewhere: in the teaching of a crude Marxism linked to structuralism, and in the withdrawal of the insurrectional left. Student training in the craft of the historian was neglected. Marc Bloch was barely read, and if he was, it was a privilege enjoyed only by students specializing in World History.
The creator of the concept of “total history,” another Frenchman—Professor Pierre Vilar—inspired me through his work Initiation to the Vocabulary of Historical Analysis (1980), a magnificent piece of precision and reflection on the historical. He wrote:
“I’ve always dreamed of a ‘treatise on history.’ I find it irritating to see so many ‘treatises’ on sociology, economics, political science, anthropology on the shelves of our libraries, but none on history, as if historical knowledge—which is a condition for all others since every society exists in time—were incapable of constituting itself as a science.”
In this sense, I have found it necessary to warn about the gravest and most common errors and omissions committed in the field of history.
From Marc Bloch, the creator of the idea of the historian’s craft, I have continually drawn guidance for both teaching and researching history using contributions from all social sciences (and sometimes the natural sciences). The comparative method that he and Febvre proposed in the Annales School is masterfully displayed in works such as The Royal Touch (1924), Feudal Society (1939–1940), and especially The Historian’s Craft (1942)—described by Georges Duby as “the agenda of an artisan.” Written under Nazi occupation in France, the book is often called “Marc Bloch’s interrupted manuscript.” It is not a work of philosophy of history, nor of empirical methodology; rather, it presents the problems and challenges that a historian encounters while reflecting on the purpose of their work, inviting readers to understand the internal processes of the historian’s craft. It is my bedside book.
The Spanish-speaking world has embraced this work, with nearly 19 reprintings by 1994 since the Fondo de Cultura Económica (Mexico) first published it in 1952, translated by Pablo González Casanova and Max Aub under the unfortunate title Introduction to History. In 1949, one of Bloch’s students, Françoise Chevalier, arrived in Mexico and taught classes attended by Federico Brito Figueroa—a persecuted Venezuelan intellectual under the Pérez Jiménez dictatorship. Upon returning to Venezuela in 1960, Brito founded the country’s first postgraduate history programs, which continued at Universidad Santa María, where he met the young Professor Reinaldo Rojas. Together, in Barquisimeto, they established the Buría Foundation under a pomarrosa tree, and in 1986, they published Venezuela’s first edition of The Historian’s Craft.
It was in this fertile stream of thought that I, the author of these lines, joined in 1989. As the “short century,” as Eric Hobsbawm called it, approached its end, I began postgraduate studies in history under the guidance of Drs. Brito Figueroa and Rojas and was introduced to the methodological and scientific possibilities of the Annales School. Within this scholarly community based in Barquisimeto, Venezuela, focused on research lines such as “Social and Institutional History of Education in the Central-Western Region of Venezuela” and “Social Networks, Culture, and Religious Mentality,” I have experienced some of the most rewarding intellectual and personal satisfactions of my life.
Thus, the reader now holds the reflections of a seasoned educator and researcher in Clio’s science—reflections that, like sentences from Scripture, dare to present these Eight Deadly Sins of the Historian. Can this ominous number be increased? Yes—it is both possible and necessary. As Pierre Vilar reminds us, history is a science still in the making. And, as he adds in Growth and Development and History of Spain, history is the only tool that can provide a rational, if not strictly scientific, understanding of the world. The “sins,” then, represent anti-science or pseudo-science.
First Sin: Anachronism
Anachronism is nothing other than seeing the past through the eyes of the present. The French historian Lucien Febvre gave us a magnificent example to understand this first sin:
“Anachronism is giving Diogenes an umbrella and Mars a machine gun. Or, if you prefer, it’s inserting Offenbach (the French operetta composer) and his Belle Hélène into the history of religious or philosophical ideas—where perhaps they have no place at all…”
The umbrella, an invention produced many centuries later, has strong associations with the reclusive 19th century. A similar thing happened to me personally. Once, a hotel was inaugurated in Carora, Venezuela, named El Conquistador, and someone painted a mural featuring several conquistadors on a beach. One of them is shown scanning the horizon with a telescope—an instrument that, as we know, we owe to Galileo Galilei, the 17th-century physicist and astronomer.
“But isn’t a century a small difference?” you might ask. Maybe. But showing conquistadors using a telescope in 1569, when Galileo invented it in 1609, is sheer nonsense—placing into use an optical instrument 50 years before it existed!
Another example: a local historian from Carora, Dr. Ambrosio Perera, claimed that the city’s repopulator in 1572, Juan de Salamanca, was “very Catholic,” as if that were a distinctive trait. But in truth, all men and women in the 16th century were fervent Catholics. It could not be otherwise in “the century that wants to believe,” as Febvre put it.
Anachronism also includes calling 16th-century conquistadors “Europeans,” since Europe as a political entity did not yet exist. According to Eric Hobsbawm, Europe is a later invention—Europe, as a concept, is a 17th-century construct. He suggests calling them Christians instead.
The late American paleontologist, geologist, and science philosopher Stephen Jay Gould (1941–2002) noted that paleontologists reconstruct according to their own prejudices and standard imagery. He recounted the example of London sculptor Waterhouse Hawkins (1807–1889), who reconstructed Labyrinthodon, an early amphibian, based only on a skull. Hawkins modeled the animal like a modern frog—short-bodied with powerful hind legs—though we now know it was elongated with four relatively equal limbs. Thus, Gould argues, the chronicle of changing fossil restorations is also a fascinating reflection of our social and intellectual history. The interplay between external empirical evidence and internal social bias drives the dynamics of change in science.
Yet there is a new form of anachronism that emerged with the first gothic science-fiction novel: Frankenstein; or, the Modern Prometheus (1818) by Mary Shelley. This type is inverse in character—not projecting the present onto the past, but the present onto the future. Think of 1984 by George Orwell or Brave New World by Aldous Huxley. These authors projected their era’s political and scientific fears (atomic bombs, fascist and communist totalitarianism, Cold War paranoia) into dystopian futures. One might also include the mass manipulation of opinion pioneered by Western liberal democracies, like the UK and the US—an idea developed by American linguist Noam Chomsky. These dystopias depict a world of terror, roboticized men and women, and the death of free will. As German philosopher Jürgen Habermas would later diagnose, our era suffers from loss of meaning and loss of freedom.
Returning to the anachronism that concerns us: Febvre powerfully illustrates the impossibility of 16th-century atheism. Atheism, as a condition of the human spirit, is the product of Enlightenment, positivism, and Marxism—all later developments. In the 16th century, the language to express unbelief didn’t exist.
In his 1942 masterpiece The Problem of Unbelief in the 16th Century: The Religion of Rabelais, Febvre explains:
“We begin by considering the means, conditions, and possibilities. The essential question is one that no one had yet properly posed for the 16th century: what kind of clarity, penetration, and effectiveness (by our standards) could the thought of men from that time—French men in particular—possess, when they had no access to the words we now take for granted in philosophical discourse?”
He then lists many adjectives that were simply absent in that era: absolute, relative, concrete, confused, adequate, intrinsic, virtual, inherent, transcendental, etc.
And for nouns: causality, regularity, concept, deduction, analysis, synthesis, intuition, coordination, classification, and many more.
Even the word system, so crucial to rationalist thought, did not exist. Nor did terms like deism, theism, pantheism, materialism, naturalism, fatalism, determinism, optimism, pessimism, skepticism, or fideism.
Febvre’s point is that these key terms—mental tools we now consider essential for critical thought—simply did not exist in the mental universe of 16th-century people.
Other terms foreign to that period include: libertine, free thinker, tolerance, intolerance, irreligious, controversy, or even scientific tools like telescope, microscope, barometer, thermometer, orbit, ellipse, revolution, and constellation.
No wonder Febvre would declare so firmly:
“The greatest of all sins, the most unforgivable one: anachronism.”
Second Sin: Believing Oneself a Historian Without Being One
Lucien Febvre, co-founder of the Annales School with Marc Bloch in 1929 and a specialist in 16th-century cultural history, said:
“A historian is not someone who knows. A historian is someone who investigates.”
There are highly memorized individuals who know the Dictionary of the History of Venezuela from the Fundación Polar by heart—and this makes them appear to be historians. These well-intentioned people, while perhaps impressive to the untrained, fail to understand that a historian is forged at their workbench—like an artisan—an image beautifully used by Marc Bloch.
Classroom teachers often pass as historians without actually being so. What’s worse, they read mostly school textbooks, rarely engaging with the works of true historians—much less the originals, relying instead on abridged versions or summaries found online. The textbook has done considerable harm to the teaching of historical science in our schools, high schools, and universities.
“It is the predominance of the sad manual in our current reading culture,” Bloch wrote, “where the obsession with a poorly conceived education replaces true synthesis.”
A historian is not made solely in libraries—they are formed in archives, through travel, lived experience, and age. The owl of Minerva (symbol of wisdom) takes flight at dusk (i.e., in old age), as Immanuel Kant himself understood.
Marc Bloch, near the end of his life in 1942, wrote:
“There’s one precaution the usual critics of history have failed to take. Their words may be eloquent and witty, but generally, they’ve forgotten to accurately inform themselves on what they’re talking about. Their image of our work doesn’t seem to come from the workshop. It smells more like academic rhetoric than a workspace.”
Historians deal with humble technical details—but history isn’t like watchmaking or carpentry. Bloch warned:
“History is an effort to know better; thus, it is a thing in motion. Simply describing things as they are will always betray it somewhat. What’s more important is to show how it progressively seeks to shape itself.”
There is a vast legion of amateur history enthusiasts who believe, like 19th-century positivists, that history simply involves establishing chains of cause and effect—that hypotheses emerge automatically from studying “facts,” and that scholarly erudition directly determines historical truth. Eric Hobsbawm noted that this approach left the discipline deliberately backward, with insignificant and accidental contributions to the understanding of human society. Curiously, in Venezuela, even this outdated methodology only became influential during the 20th century.
Romantic history—like that written by Eduardo Blanco in Venezuela Heroica (1881), a literary monument to patriotic fervor—has remained widely read and enthusiastically embraced into the present day. In the early 20th century, positivist historian Laureano Vallenilla Lanz (1870–1936) criticized these romantic narratives as outdated, disconnected from the methodology of the natural sciences. In Disintegration and Integration (1930), he argued that Venezuela had two constitutions: one on paper and another that truly governed the people. He championed the construction of a scientific history based on the positivist paradigm of thinkers like Renan, Taine, Seignobos, Le Bon, and Langlois—having audited courses at the Sorbonne and Collège de France in Paris.
However, Vallenilla Lanz seems unaware of the monumental conceptual revolution that occurred in historical practice beginning in 1900. That year, philosopher Henri Berr proposed expanding the object of history to include society, economy, and culture. He lamented that historians failed to reflect on the deeper foundations of their work. According to Julio Aróstegui, this problem still persists. He noted that:
“Historians were never expected to have philosophical training, knowledge of related disciplines, or specific scientific training. The profession always focused on document handling.”
In Spain, this training remains grossly insufficient, inadequate, and even negligent, due to those who design and tolerate the existing curricula.
Henri Berr, then, served as a kind of bridge between 19th-century critical historiography and the Annales School, founded in Strasbourg in 1929 by Bloch and Febvre—marking a third turning point in historiography, after positivism and Marxism.
A true historian, then, must also be a geographer, jurist, sociologist, psychologist, linguist, and semiotician—someone who, as Febvre said, must not close their eyes to the great transformations occurring in the physical sciences: relativity, quantum mechanics, chaos theory, Gödel’s theorems, complexity theories, cybernetics, catastrophe theory, cloning, stem cells, fractals, morphic resonance, psi theory, fuzzy logic, Gestalt theory, the Anthropic Principle, the Big Bang, the arrow of time, weak force, black holes, wormholes, general systems theory, complementarity principle, string theory, quarks, Bell’s Theorem—and so on.





















